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We will see that the asyrnmetrical iiiterdependence between Saussure's emphasis on language's social aspect and Chomsky's iiiterest in language's mental structure will hnve intriguing consequences for tlie issues related to phylogenetic development. Both Saussure arid Cliomsl<y view the language faculty as an inherited biological condition and the use of language as a process carried out by individual, psyclio-physical mechanisms operating under various conditioris.
To suggest how linguistics can contribute to the understanding of language phylogenesis, we need to inake tlie above concepts slightly more specific. Following Chomsky (1986) . this can be done along the following lines. The formal structiire of the human language capacity that organises possible systenis of linguistic kiiowledge is called Universal Graminar (UG). The systerii of knowledge that determiiies a possible natural language (L), the "internal language" L, is cliaracterised by the Grammar (G) of L. The structure of a given utterance (U) determined by L is characterised by the structural description (SD) of u. UG, G, and SD are theoretical constructs corresponding to or describing mental structures that are schematically related in the following way:
ontogenesis actual genesis (language origin) (language acquisition) (language use)
The processes indicated by tlie arrows are, of course, fuiidamentally different. First, language use -primarily the production and comprehension of utterances -consists of short-term processes lasting seconds or less. They are relevant because they are tlie source of all primary linguistic data. One might furthermore argue, like Hubert Haider ( 199 1 ), that UG's properties are essentially duc to the processing routines by which humans deal with linguistic utterances.
Second, tlie Ianguage acquisition process is part of individual human organisnis' (presumably epigenetic) development. It is relevant because it depends (in addition to the actual experience a child is exposed to) 011 the laiiguage capacity -that is, UG. UG renders the process possible and thus shapes the structure o f the resulting knowledge.
Tliird the pliylogenetic process from which UG originates is subject to biological evolution. Yet the origin of UG should obviously not be confilsed with tlie origin of a priinordial langiiage. The forrner is part of biological evolution, whereas the fatter is 6 r t of cognifive orsocial evolution. Nearly all speculations about language origin -including those of Plato. Leibniz,
I
Herder, and Engels -either address the origin of language ltnowledge (usually: words) or simply confound the two issues.
Evolution

I
Language capacity -and thus UG as its structural aspect -is a species-specific trait of homo sapiens. In other words, its genetic foundation must reside in the 1.5 percent that, according to a recent assessinent, distinguishes the human genome from that of our closest relatives. Like any other genetically determined trait, language capacity is the result of evolution. Following Gerald Edelman ( I 987), evolution can be characterised by three conditions. Variation creates randomly alternative properties, the origin of which is not causally connected to the conditions governing subsequent processes of selection. Selection favours certain variants over others during encounters with an independently changing environinent. Hereditji distributes tlie favoured variants within a population via differential reproduction or amplification. Variation applies to the individual's genotype, selection applies to its phenotype, and heredity to the population the individual belongs to. The standard Daminian view conceives of selection as adaptive in the sense that tlie variants survive via reproduction if they guarantee their bearer a benefit over possible competitors in survival and reproduction, thus spreading the selected property within the population. Selection thus guarantees adaptation according to environinental conditions. This notion of adaptive selection, typically referred to as "survival of the fittest", requires two significant amendinents.
First, random variants that do not provide a benefit might survive and be I reproduced -without adaptive consequences -as long as they do not represent a manifest disadvantage. Stephen J. Gould (1982) With respect to langiiage, there is no reasoii to suppose researcliers will one day identify a discrete group of genes that separately and completely deterinine nothing but a well-defined, adaptively selected brain structure supporting just the capacity described by UG.
Signals a~7d r l ? o~g l~t~
Nevertlieless, language capacity and the knowledge it gives rise to comprise a biologically determined mental system that organises a specific component of human behaviour. It interacts with other systems of the mindtbrain like vision and hearing as weil as locomotion and otlier motor activities. Even though tliere are obvioiis and relevant conditions shared by several of these Systems -including linear organisation, hierarchical structure, and invariant Patterns retrievable from iiiemory -language capacity has its own, domainspecific properties. Roughly speaking, language capacity recruits two pliylogenetically prior systems of mental organisation, thereby creating a systematic correspondeiice between their representations. The first is the system of articulation and perception (A-P) that underlies the production and recognition of invariant structures of external signals. The second is the systeni nf conceptualisation and intention (C-I) that allows for concephially organised and intentionally controlled representations of experience.
Botli A-P and C-T, which support what is usually termed the form and iiieaning of linguistic expressions, inight in theniselves be complex aggregates of mental organisation. A-P is normally instantiated by the systems that control vocal articulation aiid auditory perception. But recent research initiated by Edward Klima and Ursula Bellugi ( 1979) clearly demonstrates that sign language, based on the production and perception of visual signals, represents a fully adequate alternative. C-I must be construed as integrating the f~ill range of systems involved in conceptual organisation, intentional control, and niotivational instigation of experience aiid behaviour. Both systems are products of previous evolutionary Stages. Tliey migl~t also exhibit new~rope~ties,siner-thelangmgeespaei--etcploltstheir-possi bblities; Schematically, these considerations can be abbreviated as follows:
We can also refine things somewhat. The knowledge of L, characterised by G, determines the correspondence between A-P and C-I by means of the phonetic form interface (PF) and the semantic form interface (SF), where PF and SF represent those aspects of A-P and C-I on which the correspondence between the two domains relies. These refinements yield following schema:
Based on the possibilities provided by UG, G determines the relation given by pairs (x, o) , where x and o belong to PF and SF, respectively. The I I crucial point is that this relation ranges over an unlimited Set of pairs. G must therefore be a System for computing new pairs on demand. This has I far-reaching consequences.
I I
Properties of UG
It is an empirical fact that normal human beings acquire the language spoken in their environment on the basis of varying and incomplete input. Yet external input only partially determines tlie structure and result of this epigenetic process. It must also rely on internal, biologically fixed conditions. UG specifies the structural conditions this internal disposition contributes to the structure and result of the language acquisition process. These internal conditions cannot be inspected directly. They therefore must be identified hypothetically by examining the structure of the observable result. Section 2.1 sketches UG's main traits.
I. Le.~ical items und thcir conzhination
As a necessary condition, a systeni of linguistic knowledge must organise a fairly large set of basic expressions or lexical items (roughly: words), each associating a form K (a representation in PF) with its meaning o (a representation iii SF). However, for pairs (K, o) to be able to f~~nction as proper linguistic expressions, they must be categorised by grainmatical features determining tlieir possible coinbination into larger expressions. (1) below provides the most elementary illustration of this point. It conibines the words daddy and junly in different ways, leading to different categories of expressions:
(1) (a) daddy jumps (b) daddy's jump (C) jumpiiig daddy In ( I a),-juinp is a verb, the final -s indicates the personal intlectiori, and the whole expression a clause. In (lb), jump is a noun, the -.
T attaclied to daddy indicates the possessive case, and the whole expression is a nominal phrase withjurnp as its nucleus. In (Ic), the inflection -irzg turns juinp into an adjective inodifying dada),, which in this case is the nucleus. The knowledge of lexical items thus comprises three types of information ( (2) (a) (Ijumpl, [Verb] , JUMP) (b) (Ijumpl, [Nounl, JUMP ) (2) (a) and (b) must presumably be treated as one lexical entry, allowing for [Verb] and [Noun] as alternative specifications of GF, These simplified examples indicate that UG must, among other things, provide the following conditions:
(3) (a) Accessibility of primitive elements in terms of which the interface representations PF and SF and the categorisation GF can be specified and fixed in inemory.
(b) The general format of lexical data structures coinprising (PE GE SF).
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Three things need to be emphasised. First, the general availability of specific types of primitive elen~ents, their properties, and their organisational format in lexical items are neither obvious nor trivial. They are crucial determinants of the way in which linguistic expressions can be organised. Moreover, they specify the structure of representations supporting the inental computation of complex expressions. Second, GFs like Noun, Verb, Genitive, and so forth determine which lexical information goes beyond the rnere association of form and meaning. It is the graminatical inforrnation g that determines the combinatorial possibilities of words and distinguishes thern from labelled concepts. Finally, lexical items can be subject to inflection and derivation -the two branches of Morphology -, which is another of GF's facets. Morphological distinctions allow recurrent conditions in the SF-PF correspondence to be explicitly related to and fixed by features of GF. This provides guidelines for the combinatorial aspect of linguistic expressions, as even simple cases like (1) above indicate.
The following constructions with the particle again demonstrate how intricate lexical information and its combinatorial aspects are. Their PF differs only by nuclear-stress placement (inarked by capital letters). But the corresponding SF requires different conditions (informally added in parentheses): In other words, ngain adds the notion of repetition to both assertions about Mary having left. If, as in (4b), again is stressed, it repeats the event of Mary's leaving, whereas if, as in (4a), Ieji is stressed, only the state of Mary's absence is repeated. In ( 5 ) , the required lexical inforination is indicated in a rather provisional way:
(b) Content of P is determined by position and stress.
"REPETITION OF P" indicates that P presupposes that P was the case before (Stechow 1996 offers a detailed discussion of the complexities of agaiti). I Want to emphasise two things. First. knowledge of particles like crgain, also, or almost involves intricate conditions relating lexical information to the combinatorial requirements of syntactic, semantic, and even phonetic sfructure: Second, comptexities of rtiis sort are by no nieans exotic or marginal phenomena, biit belong to the core of linguistic knowledge. Even though their specific details differ fron? language to Ianguage and are subject to language acquisition, UG provides the general possibility of tlieir structure.
Hierarchy und con?positiorzalit~~
The principles by wliich the combinatorial conditions of lexical items are realised are largely predetermined and subject to highly restricted variation in language acquisition. With respect to PF, combination essentially consists of sequential ordering. For example, Jolzn is followed by walks, which is followed by slorr~Zv in John wa/ks slo~~l/y. Things are less trivial if prosodic consequences -Stress and intonation -are considered, but these aspects are still related to the Signal's linear organisation. The crucial step is due to SF which imposes an inherently nonlinear, hierarchical structure on the sequential combination of basic expressions. This hierarchy and its constituents create the GF, usually represented by tree structures or bracketings, as illustrated in (6). Here, constituents are categorised by features originating in the GF information of lexical items:
The category symbols (D, N, P, V; C for Determiner, Noun, Preposition, Verb, and Clause and X' for complex catecories with the head or nucleus X) are standard abbreviations. Their particular properties need not concern us here. (Ga) is equivalent to the labelled braclteting (6b). The principle underlying this type of structure can be characterised as follows: (7) Two constituents X and Y combine into a complex constituent [yX Y] , where the category y is determined by tlic category of the head.
This formulation is somewhat simplified. In particular, it ignores the nontrivial selectional conditions lexical items impose on potential co-constituents, as illiistrated above with respect to again (see Bienvisch 1997 for a detailed discussion).
Example (6) illustrates what is traditionally called Constituency or Phrase Structure. It is an essential factor in the computation by which c0n.iplex expressions derive their meaning. It gradually integrates the lexical items' SF into the SF of more complex constituents. The SF of the Determiner the therefore combines with the conceptual conditions of the Noun desk, selecting from the (situational) context a particular object that ineets just tllese conditions. The next step turns the individual thus specified into the anchor point of the relation expressed by the Preposition on, which fixes the location of the act ascribed to Mavy. More generally, the hierarchy described by Phrase Structure controls the Compositionality of the mental computation, by which a conlplex expression's SF derives from the SF of its constituents on the basis of their combination. This effect can be observed directly in cases of Phrase Structure differences. For instance, if we replace the verb Ieave by the verb huy, the natural structure would be (8). Here, on the desk combines with hook, adding further conditions to the ob-ject in question rather than to Mary's act of buying:
In many cases, two alternative structures that determine clearly different meanings . Thus in (9), in which only the relevant djfferences in constituency are indicated, we get (9a), in which Robert Redford is most likely a protagonist of the-film and (9b), in which he is a participant of the discussion. In other words, the structural ambiguity of linguistic expressions can come from an alternative Phrase Structure being assigned to the same PF.
Chains qf positions
A further cliaracteristic property of natural languages seems to go beyond the minimal requirements for the niapping between PF and SE A constituent's sequential position in PF may not correspond to the role it plays in SE A characteristic case in point is the position of the finite verb in German, Dutch, and a number of other languages:
(1 0) (a) daß das Konzert erst eine halbe Stunde später anfing.
(b) das Konzert fing erst eine halbe Stunde später an.
((that) the concert didn't began until a half hour later)
Because anfangen must be registered as a lexical item, the SF of which cannot be derived from that of an and fangen, the two parts of tlie Verb separated in (1 Ob),,fing and an, must be one constituent witli respect to SF, as is overtly the case in the subordinate clause construction (1 Oa). Hence,.fing has two functions in (1 Ob): an overt position in PF and a covert participation in the Verb's SF. The relevant structure resembles (1 I), in which fing indicates tlie covert position; the arrow connects it to its overt realisation:
The pnnciple that leads to chains of positions can be formulated as follows:
( 1 2) A constituent X can occupy more than one position in a structure K depending on the grammatical features of X and K, forming a cliain (X,, ... X , ) of positions, in which only X, is realised in PF.
The features on ~vhich chain formation depends originate in the lexical items involved. The details are anything but trivial, but need not concern us here.
As cases like (1 3) show, a complex expression niay contain more tlian one chain, whereas (14) illustrates the fact that chains may be involved in the ambiguity of linguistic expressions: (13) In (14a), Mary intends to leave, whereas in (14b) Mary had plans to drop off. Typically, ( 14a) has nuclear stress on leai.1e, (1 4b) on plans.
Tlze innateness nf UG
To sum up, UG must essentially provide the following conditions or principles:
( 1 5 The above description of UG's content is, of course, simplified. For rny purposes here it is important to note that the conditions (1 5)(a) to (C) -with the possible exception of Morphology -are conceptually necessary for any system generating a correspondence between A-P and C-I that goes beyond a list of pairs (TC, o) . By contrast, (1 5d) is an empirical fact about the human language capacity that does not seem to be logically necessary. In any event, only Systems with tlie above four abbreviated structural principles can supPort the knowiedge and use of a natural language. By the Same token, these principles delimit the range of possible natural languages. This includes t h e i r~~g r a p h i c a l , historical, o r seeial vctriution.
What is the status of tlie principles constituting UG? We don't kno\v how genetically determined aspects of complex behaviour are realised in the brain, let alone how the brain's relevant properties are determined by DNA structure. Nevertheless, overwhelming ethological evidence suggests that certain aspects of human behaviour have an inherited and genetically fixed basis. There is no reason to doubt that the language capacity is among them. There seem to be two Iogical possibilities regarding the more specific assuniptions summarised in (1 5):
(16) Nativist position: UG characterises domain-specific, genetically fixed principles that merely support the ability to acquire and iise a natural language.
( 1 7) Empiricist position: UG consists of principles that emerge from the I interaction of general mechanistns of association and combination with actual linguistic input.
There are two versions of the nativist position. The maturational hypothesis (see Borer and Wexler 1987) assumes that components of UG become available according to the schedule of (early) ontogenetic development. Pinker's (1994) homogeneity hypothesis assumes that UG is in place from the very beginning. Although recent research into brain maturation seems to render the inaturational hypothesis more plausible, both versions presuppose that UG is genetically fixed.
The empiricist position (see Elman et al. 1996) , on the other hand, assumes tliat the properties of linguistic knowledge emerge from general principles of cognitive organisation. This eliininates the need to stipulate innate conditions specifically supporting the language capacity. The problem with this position is tliat it either has to claim (contrary to fact) that nonhumans will acquire and use language if exposed to appropriate inpiit or has to include the relevant disposition as a specific component of its general cognitive equipment and its genetic foundation. But this is simply anotlier way of positiiig what is ultimately a biologically fixed basis for tlie conditions summarised in (1 5).
The evolution of the language capacity
Assuming that conditions like those in (15) must somehow be fixed in humans' genetic endowment, how could the language capacity have developed phylogenetically?
The paradox o f adaptive selection
The theory of adaptive evolution appears to provide a straightfonvard explanation. A random genetic variation determines a change in brain structure that supports the capacity to produce and comprehend signals that systematically represent complex cognitive structures. Individuals with the ability to communicate verbally have a selective advantage over competitors who lack it. Hence, adaptive selection favours the language capacity, though its genetic basis originated by chance. But this explanation contains a vicious circle.
First, although it does not matter at this point whether (1 5) correctly characterises the basic traits of this heritage, it is crucial that the genetic basis distinctively accounts for the ability in question. Second, adaptive selection favours this ability if and only if its benefits can be exploited in actual behaviour. This requires at least a limited population to communicate with. The members of this population must therefore already have and use the capacity in question.
In otlier words, explaining the language capacity by adaptive selection presupposes the property it atternpts to explain. The theory of evolution has to cope with this problem for all cases of genetically determined social behaviour, Yet it is of particular intricacy in the case of linguistic communication because the selectional advantage presupposes not only the population whose members previously developed the capacity, but also a language -that is, a system of knowledge based on this capacity -without which the capacity would be of no adaptive value. The language capacity is an empirical fact, one that is controversial only with respect to its specificity and not to its biological foundation. So there inust be ways to avoid the above paradox. In my opinion, there are at least three ways of addressing the issue. They are not mutually exclusive.
The first option is to abandon the restriction iniposed by adaptive selection and to assume that the language capacity's genetic foundation is due to exaptation (See section 1.2). More specifically, the language capacity and UGS principles sketched in (15) can be genetically fixed and inherited without immediate beliavioiiral consequences. Their fiill potential will be realised orily if appropriate conditioris arise. Moreover, the genetic foundation might be a by-product of other (perhaps more general) changes like the relative growth of tlie brain or tlie modification of its architecture. This seems to be Chomsky's (1 988) somewhat sceptical position regarding the adaptive explanation. His scepticism is siipported by the fact that we know little about the details of genetic information, about the causal structure by which the brain is controlled by the genome, or about the way the brain effects tlie behaviour. All we do kiiow is that the behaviour exhibits the specific properties illustrated above and that it is species-specific. Furtliermore. we know that certain principles of linguistic behaviour (hierarchical structure or the fixing of information chunks in memory) are exploited in domains of behaviour that are not species-specific. Hierarchical structure occurs in various types of inotor action, information cliunks fixed in niemory are crucial for visual perception, and so On. We do not, however, know what aspects of genetically fixed brain structure constitute language's species-specific domain, the domain that computes the systematic correspondence between conceptualisation and articulation.
The second option is to retain adaptive selection and to emphasise the language capacity's cognitive -as opposed to its comniunicative -benefits. Tliat is, the circularity is removed if the advantage of language does not depend on the behaviour of otlier niembers of the population. There is no need to assume that the capacity and its use are already in place, since the ndvantage only concerns the organism that exhibits the innovation. It consists of the increasing efficiency of cognition (including its far-reacliing consequences) brought about by the access to conceptual structures via independently organised and rnemorised signals. Johann Gottfried Herder's essay on language origin (1772) Stresses precisely this cognitive benefit. For Herder, Besonnenheit (reflection) is the crucial property that makes language possible. It not only enables humans to identifi invariant characteristics, but also to associate tliem with reproducible signals. There are two reasons why Herder does not account for the language capacity. First, lie is more concerned with naining o b j e m s f i i~i t h ä d d~~s i s i~i g rtie cornbinäeorial asqxct.
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Second, he tries to explain the creation of words and takes for granted the capacity to name objects, namely "reflection". Moreover, the cognitive perspective on adaptive selection shares a significant problem witli the communicative approach. In order to establish tlie relevant advantage, the language capacity must Support the spontaneous acquisition and use of linguistic knowledge. Yet this presupposes that a linguistic system is available. True, the cognitive perspective can attribute the creation of such a system to an isolated individual, but this is an artificial assumption that requires justification.
Evolutionary theory seems to offer the third and apparently most plausible option to avoid the paradox of adaptive selection. Evolution, after all, is the cumulative result of tiny steps. Tlie vertebrate eye is the result of numerous minor changes. The Same could be true of UG. There are at least two versions of this proposition. Pinker (1994) points out that UG combines a number of more or less self-contained subsystems or modules, Iike Morphology, Phonology, Phrase Structure, and so forth. These might well be the result of independent developmental steps, of which UG is the sum. Though this model is largely in line with generally accepted principles of evolution, it creates crucial difficulties if adaptive selection is assumed to be decisive with respect to the individual steps. In fact, Pinker runs into the Same paradox I discussed above, creating even greater difficulties. Take, for instance, Morphology, the ability to systematically relate graminatical properties to (partial) conceptual interpretation. What is the adaptive advantage of such a capacity if there is, first, no grammatical system for it to improve and, second, no group of speakers whose behaviour is based on tlie Same principles? This paradox applies to any component of UG one might single out for separate evolution. The problem is that though a marginal improveinent in an organism's vision yields immediate selective advantages, there is no comparable benefit in acquiring a subcomponent of UG -unless we assuine that it generates advantages in other behavioural Systems. But then we would no longer be talking about the language capacity.
Bickerton ( 1 995) offers another version of the gradualist position. It differs in two respects. First, the gradual development consists of only a few stages. One of these is a so-called "protolanguage", from which tlie modern language capacity evolves. Protolanguage (comparable to the first stages of language acquisition or of pidginisation) is a restricted lexical System with a limited Syntax for combining lexical items. Second, these stages are assumed to have adaptive value for cognition and communication.
-.
Ianguage, which eventually activated the language capacity. We lack direct evidence about both language origin and the evolution of the language capacity. Nevertheless, tlie relevant facts regarding language origin fall witliin the range of linguistic theorising, whereas this is hardly the case witli phylogenetic issues regarding the language capacity.
Following Bickerton ( 1995) and particularly Jackendoff ( l999), in the remarks below I assume stages in the origin of language. stages that presumably interacted with the evolution of the underlying capacity. These stages do not correspond to modules of L -or of UG, as Pinker assumes -, but are closely related to the phenotype of language use. The scenario I describe below does not pretend to be a reconstruction of the actual developmental path, but represents a logical possibility.
The necessary principles of UG must be related to properties of linguistic expressions that could be (or in fact are) realised, given the constitutive condition of mapping Articulation to Conceptualisation. This yields a conceptually necessary set of properties that can be arranged in developmental stages. Two indispensable capacities are to be identified in this respect, whose characteristic prerequisites and consequences will be articulated in due Course:
(1 8) Stimulus-free and situationally independent assignment of structured signals to conceptual representations (arbitrary sign formation).
I
(1 9) Systematic, recursive combination of signs into structures support-, ing compositional interpretation (compositionality).
1
Condition ( I 8) roughly corresponds to Herder's notion of "reflection" as the source of language. It marks a decisive difference between human language and animal communication. In Bickerton's (1995) view, (18) and (19) represent two stages in the development of both the language capacity and of language. Condition ( 1 8) results in what Bickerton calls "protolanguage", which is transformed by the addition of (19) into iiiodern human language. Tt might turn out, however, that arbitrary sign forniation has the Same condition of possibility as compositionality -in other words, that independence of stimulus control for basic expressions is tantamount to the capacity to combine them. I will leave the issue Open, noting, though, that Jackendoff (1999) points out that modern languages exhibit fossilised cases of prelinguistic items like shh, lzej" or ozrch, which are dependent on specific situations and simultaneously devoid of syntactic Status.
Whereas exclamations like hej-or \z~o\o are only appropriate in relevant situations, ivords iike,julr?p or cIog do not depend on a dog or a jumping action being present. The crucial point is that a structure in C-I becomes accessible by a Pattern in P-A. As 1 mentioned above, the relation on which this accessibility rests is the rna-jor topic in tlle history of attempts to account for the origin of language. There are three basic proposals. First, Herder (1772) posits an act of naming caused by a salient feature of the thing to be identified. His example is a bleating slieep, which receives its name (internal bleating) by a sort of indexical relation. Second, Leibniz (1710) considers the act of naming to be based on the analogy between the shape of the name and the emotion induced by the perception of the object. His model postulates a synesthetic sin~ilarity berween sound-pattern and object-sensation. The third proposal is that the links between words and meaniiigs are conventional and arbitrary. All three semiotic types -indexical, iconic, and conventional signs -are involved in tlie mapping between A-P and C-1. Yet tliere can be little doubt that arbitrary signs comprise the ovenvhelming mtiority.
More iinportant than the origin of individual words are tlie general conditions and consequences of the "protolexicon": the forerunner of proper lexical systems. I will address two of them.
First, the protolexicon does not liave a strictly limited number of items. This distinguislies it from systenis of priinate calls and from all other prehuman sign systems (including the vocabulary of language-trained chiinpanzees). This inay or may not be a side effect of the capacity for stimulusfree sign use. The protolexicon's elasticity means that the systein can expand increnientally. Its gradually increasing size and complexity may correspond to graduaIly increasing adaptive benefits. This avoids the theoretical pitfalls of adding up ClG modules that Iack independent useability. Moreover, once the protolexicon capacity is part of a population's genetic endowment, an expanding actual protolexicon caii be transmitted as cultural rather than biological heritage.
Second, an increasingly large set of items cannot be accommodated as global, unstructured chunks of information, but only on the basis of systematic organisation that relies on structural dimensions or featiires of representation. This is true for aspects of both domains linked by the lexical systeni: conceptual relations in C-I and articulatory conditions in A-P. This raises tfTe question of wlietlier primitive eTements oTPF ancTSF are geneti-cally fixed prerequisites of the linguistic structure. In Bierwisch (2000), I have argued that UG iieed not provide fixed repertoires. but only general conditions, on which epigenetic development then constructs the actual primes via triggering experience. In any case, the protolexicon integrates two systems that become systematically structured in their own right. This is not a post-hoc effect, but an initial condition that first enables the formation of stimulus-free pairs of form and meaning.
The protolexicon's systematic nature seems to imply two other phenomena. The first is the initiation of Morphology. This involves formal features that are not (like phonetic features and semantic primes) directly based on A-P or C-I, but only have a status within the organisation of lexical items. Two stages can be identified. They build on each other logically, though not perforce developmentally. The examples below from English illustrate the two stages. Words like those in (2021) differ with respect to sex, but share the other conceptual conditions; no feature or segnieiit in PF corresponds to the seinantic distinction between male and female. By contrast, half the words in (20b) have the suffix -ess to mark the condition FEMALE; this might be said to reflect a distinction of SF in the makeup of PF.
(20) (a) son : daughter; boy : girl; uncle : aunt; king : queen:
husband : wife (b) actor : actress; prince : princess; duke : duchess; steward : stewardess This type of partial systematisation also shows up in other human sign systems like colour-coding in traffic signs and the use of subscripts or superscripts in formal languages. For example, the terms of (2 1 a) are replaced in (2 1 b) and (2 1 C) by more explicit notation:
This means that (20b) -like other arbitrary cases of derivation and inflection -relies on inherent properties of the capacity to organise nontrivial systems of pairs that relate form and meaning. The second Stage emerses when in the correspondence /-es/ [FEMALE] the condition [FEMALE] (and the suffix related to it) acquire a formal, independent status. This status is directly accessible and Supports the further systematisation of lexical elements. Once established, such a feature might be dissociated from the fixed interpretation in A-P and C-I. That is, LkFeminineJ can become a formal feat~ire of iiforrzan, gid, ,S/TE, and so fort11 as well as of items (Iike sliip names) where the conceptual condition related to FEMALC does not apply. My proposals do not ascribe a proper morphology to the protolexicon. Tliey inerely einploy present-day plienomena to indicate that elements of the sort on which inorphological systenis rely are available as a side effect of the structural conditions necessary for burgeoning protolexical systeins.
The second feature is presyntactic coinbination. The elenients of the 1 protolexicon allow tliis because they are stimulus-free and thus have an articulated structiire. Due to PF's basic liiiearity, presyntactic combination can only ainount to sequential jiixtaposition. Tliis might, liowever, lead to a I striicture in C-I that is more specific than that of tlie combined elements in isolation. The point is that we can imagine an elementary Stage wliere elenients of the protolexicon can be linked in the absence of specific conibinatorial principles. Jackendoff notes fossilised residues of tliis in modern 
One could speciilate about whether recurrent jiixtaposition, if it corresponds to conceptual conditions talten up in SF (like in find apple, eat al~ple, take apple. and fial'r apple), provides the inlierent foundation for nas-1 cent compositionality, a foundation that is comparable to the extraction of 1 grammatical features described above. Witliout straining plausibility, I will merely note tliat there are surprising presuppositions and consequences 1 connected to the capacity to create structured lexical items that are not con-I trolled by situational dependence.
In a heavily debated report, Gopnik (1 990) claiins that certain grammatical deficits have genetic causes. Even if this is correct, we still don't know which aspects of the language capacity are genetically determined or how. Tlie characteristics of Bickerton's "protolanguage" are thus speculative. This is of Course equally true for the scenario I described above and for Jackendoff's ( 1 999). But let's assume for a moineilt that the capacity to acquire and use protolexical kiiowledge is a precursor of the language capacity itself. The protocapacity can manifest itself in cliaracteristic overt beGviour. Sucli behaviour conlCists of the use-(and e~i a b l~s the accurnulafiori) of sliared knowledge in populations witli a comrnon heritage. But tliis is still different from the Ianguage capacity of recent honzo sapiens. One could even argue that the big leap involves the change(s) that catapiilt the protolexicon capacity to UG. I will characterise three of its aspects. All are related to the central role of grammatical featiires, extending protolexical items (X, o) into proper lexical items (TC. y, o) discussed in section 2.1. One may, but need not, claiin that tliis results from a single genetic condition emergjng from a single phylogenetic change.
The first aspect is the forlnation of Phrase Structure described in (6) and (7). It involves two conditions. First, it provides the Iiierarchy or braclteting that goes beyond the mere juxtaposition of words and Supports specific relations that can be drawn upon by compositional semantics as in example (9). In fact. it is needed to account for simple differences like those between (22)(a) and (b).
The second aspect is the categorisation of the constituents that accounts for the different properties of, say, his sleep (nominal head) and he sleeps (verbal head). In fact, only the integration of constituency and categorisation formulated in (7) creates UG's basic combinatorial aspect. Categorisation, however, is the core effect of formal features. This means that categories like Verb, Noun, and Determiner are just bundles of formal features. Their role is to organise the correspondence between PF and SF (see Wunderlich 1996 for an overview). It need not concern us here whetlier the relevant properties of features like [Referential] and [Functional] can be explained in a manner similar to those for [Feminine] . The point is that they determine a sort of second-order classification based on properties that do not derive directly from A-P or C-I, but from the correspondence to be established between these priniary domains. The ability set up and use this second-order classification is a plausible candidate for the property that characterises the Big Leap.
The second aspect comprises morphological features like [Feminine] . This may well be related to the role of formal features more generally and may assign an independent, central status to second-order classification. Indeed, morphological categories like Gender, Number, Case, and Aspect should not be considered as supplements made in modern laiiguages. supplements that could possibly be avoided fnr the sake of greater simplicity (Klein and-Perdtre I997 sugge~t -precisely this on the basis of the2Rasic -Vnriety" of second-laiiguage learners). Morphological categories play a central role in organisirig tlie PF-SF correspondence. Let me Sketch three interdependent aspects of this central role.
First. it is well known that inorphological features conibine into rich inflectional and derivational systems. Even Englisli, which Iias little inflectional inorpliology compared with, say, Hungarian or Georgian, displays feature combinations like (23). In these examples D Stands for the category features of Determiners; Oblique and Plural stand for Case and Number, respectively:
Inflectional systems can display remarl~ible intricacy, a subject beyond the scope of this Paper.
Second, the formal features are instrumental in establishing and regulating various types of grammatical relations imposed on the underlying Phrase Structure. One of thein concerns the selectional constraints that relate lexical iteins to their complements, as illustrated in (24) and (25). Tlie (semantically based) properties by which lexical items combine with coinplements are all specified by inorphological features:
(24) (a) he dreams something (b) he dreams of something (a') *he sleeps something (b') *he sleeps of something (25) to be tlie result of copying (or attracting) a feature from a source to a target I position (the whole constituent that contains the feature being carried along). In any case, the connection between chain positions crucially depends on the availability of formal features. In addition, chain formation is ubiquitous in natural language and reconciles inultiple requireinents that I cannot be met at the same structural position. Thougli it coniplicates the (apparently) simplest possible correspondence between PF and SF, it enables the discrepancies between conflicting conditions in Phrase Structure to be overcome. Finally, chain forrnation is a proper amendment to bare Phrase Structure. Like Phrase Structure and Morphology, it draws oii formal features, but might result from a separate step in the evolution of UG. In this paper I have commented on the following aspects of UG via which the language capacity goes beyond the protolexical capacity and underlies stages in language origin:
(28) (a) Free disposal of formal features, defining syntactic aild niorphological categories; (b) Phrase Structure, integrating general hierarchy forination with category assignment; (C) Morphological Systems that make grammatical features accessible for selectional restrictions, agreement, concord (that is, relations that enrich Phrase Structure); (d) Formation of Ctiains of structural positions connected b >~ formal P P P P P P P P P P P P P -P --P features.
One can eii-iphasisc nspects or components of the language capacity in sliglitly different \vays. For instance, tlie iniportant role played by Argument Struct~ire and tlie linking of lexical lieads to appropriate Coinplements are siibsumed liere under tlie selectional restrictions in (28c). One could easily c1nir1.i a central position for this inonientuiii. Deliniiting coinponents and subcomponents is thus a matter of areument. MV reinarks have of Course been incoinplete. 1 did not, for instance, say anything about the conditions that Support the abstractioii of eleiiients and relations of SF from C-I. Witliout these, neither contrasts like brkind tht? ivall (Iocntion) and a f i e~-f l~e id*all (time) iior the vast area of metaphors can be accountcd for. Nevertheless, it is obvious that (28) (b) (C), and (d) are logically dependent on (28a). It addresses the centrality of formal features, wliicli are -differing from phonetic and semantic primes -a kind of currency whose value is only fixed internally and due to tlie computational system that determines the correspondeiice between PF and SE It is not obvious whether Categorisation in (28b) and Morphology (28c) are independent of each other. But it is clear that the coniplexity of Chain formation (28d) presupposes (28) (a) to (C). According to Borer and Wexler (19871, it is a prime candidate for later maturatioii into ontogenetic development. Perhaps it is also a relatively late additioii phylogenetically.
Three concluding remarks
First, attempting to sort out structural conditions like in (28) above by no means implies that components of G (or UG) correspond to separate neurophysiological Counterparts. Kean (1 992) points out that there is no direct and discrete representation of grammatical components in the brnin. Moreover, this undermines speculations about simple relations between UG's properties and their genetic fouiidation. Yet if, as Kean suggests, a distinction can be made between brain Systems for representation and those for re-representation of knowledge, then linguistic knowledge crucially depei-ids on conditions of re-representation that mediate the primary representations of A-P and C-I. In this vie~v, the availability of formal features and the options bnsed on them would be among the language capacity's conclitior~es silie qua rion because re-representation seems to be the most appropriate way of characterising the essence of formal features.
Seconci, 1 have proposed how to avoid tlie paradox of lariguage evoliition by coinbining two distinct but interrelated problems, bot11 of which have to be solved anyway: the evolution of the Ianguage capacity and the origin of I linguistic knowledge. These frequently confounded issues must be clearly I distingiiished because tliey depend on fundamentally different conditions I affecting the genetic lieritage as well as possible knowledge based on it. But it seems that a plausible scenario einerges if they are construed to depend on each other in a non-vicious circle. The capacity to accumulate lexical items I coiild gradually lead to a developmental stage where a randoln variation I indeed leads to an improvemeiit of the linguistic capacity, justifying tlie I urgently desired selectional benefit. T l~e stages in this type of scenario of Course leave us with various unanswered questions. Suppose for a moment that Herder was basically right to suggest that "reflection" is the condition of possibility for the initial stage's stiinulus-free naming. 1s tlie combinatorial potential thus an iniplicit condition whose iniportance Herder failed to recognise? Or must we posit separate evolutionary steps that are not involved in building up comparatively complex protolexical items? In any event, it is clear that the accumulation and transmission of (proto) lexical knowledge relies on the social (communicative) dimension rather thaii on the strictly cognitive dimension in the development of the language capacity. Finally, the scenario's plausibility presupposes that the language capacity's evolution was gradual and that it relied on adaptive selection. This is by no means certain. In the e n d perhaps Chomsky is right to have doubts about the adaptive explanation. In the terms of one of Murphy's Laws: for any complex problem there exists a Solution that is simple, plausible, and wrong.
